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 Land expropriation compensation among multiple stakeholders in a 
mining area: explaining ³skeleton house´ compensation 
Abstract: House demolition compensation in mining areas in China is determined by house size. 
This has led farmers to engage in ³skeleton house´ construction, namely, building simple 
structures that can increase the compensation obtained following land expropriation. While 
compensation standards and social security for land-expropriated farmers has received some 
research attention, investigations are yet to consider this challenge from different stakeholder 
perspectives. Clearly identifying the interests and interactive relationships of each group offers 
potential to deliver positive outcomes for all stakeholders and for the environment. This paper 
targets this gap using document analysis alongside semi-structured interviews with the Pingshou 
China Coal Corporation (PCCC), Pinglu District Government (PDG) and land-expropriated 
farmers in Shanxi Province in Northwest China, identifying reasons for and potential solutions to, 
the phenomenon of skeleton house construction. Novel application of the DPSIR (driving 
forces-pressures-statuses-impacts-responses) framework as a structuring tool for our analysis 
provides important insight into how the emerging situation has arisen and helps to identify 
potential countermeasures. There are many differences among the perspectives of the three 
stakeholder groups, and all are responsible for the phenomenon of skeleton houses. PCCC should 
follow different production routes to reduce their costs and the impacts on farmers. District 
Government should shift from a coping position (dealing with negative impacts from the coal 
industry) towards actively shaping coal industry development, thus reducing its negative impacts 
on wider society. Land-expropriated farmers should actively participate in meaningful discussions 
to assist PCCC and PDG to make reasonable and considerate compensation standards and social 
security policies.  
 
Key words: Land use; Land expropriation; Rural settlement; DPSIR; Stakeholder; Social security; 
China 
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1 Introduction 
Land expropriation has led to concerns about adverse impacts on populations whose lands are 
lost (Mahalingam and Vyas, 2011; Ty et al., 2013). While much research has focused on issues 
concerning compensation for land-expropriated people, few researchers have examined the 
perspectives of the different stakeholders involved in the land acquisition and compensation 
process. This paper addresses this gap through focus on land expropriated for mining by central 
government mining company in China.  
What is considered adequate compensation for those who have their land expropriated differs 
markedly between countries, and between developed and developing countries. For instance, 
people in Bangladesh face severely diminished and highly uncertain livelihoods as a result of land 
expropriation (Feldman and Geisler, 2012). Pakistan adopts fixed rates of compensation in order 
to prevent speculation through which land-expropriated people acquire more land in order to get 
more compensation (Hull, 2008). The land acquisition process in India is neither consultative nor 
transparent, and compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation packages offered to former 
landowners are often outdated, inadequate or based on artificially low land values and are keenly 
contested (Mahalingam and Vyas, 2011). There is a big gap between policy and practice of 
compensation and resettlement policy in Vietnam (Dao, 2010), with procedures followed 
inadequately and little attention to due process. The law in Malaysia requires the state to pay 
adequate compensation, however, this is not defined (Alias and Daud, 2015). Together, these 
examples from Asia show a wide variety of contentious issues surrounding the reasonable 
payment of compensation. 
Laws and policies are adhered to more strictly in the developed world. For example, in the 
United States, the market value of the subject property is generally held as just compensation for 
the dispossessed owner (Eaton, 1995; Sun, 2013). In the UK, compensation is based on the 
principle of value to the owner, comprising the market value together with other losses suffered by 
the claimant (Denver-Green, 1994; DCLG, 2010). Other developed countries follow the ³land for 
land´ compensation method, where, land is given to the land-losers so they can continue with 
previous agricultural activities (Chaudhry, 2011). 
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Current compensation practices in China differ from those in other countries because of the 
forms of land ownership and the political-economic structure (Zhang and Qiu, 2013; Sun, 2013). 
In China, the state (or local government) pays farmers a fee which takes four elements into 
account: (1) compensation for the land, (2) resettlement allowance for displaced people, (3) 
compensation for ground attachments, and (4) compensation for lost or un-harvested crops (Lin 
and Ho, 2005). A multiple output method has been adopted to calculate compensation, considering 
the value RI WKH ODQG¶V DYHUDJH RXWSXW RYHU WKH SUHYLRXV three years (Sun, 2013). The total 
compensation payable cannot be higher than 30 times the value RIWKHODQG¶VDYHUDJHRXWSXWRYHU
the previous three years (Tan et al., 2009).  
When provided, compensation is usually monetary and generally considered insufficient 
(Bao and Peng, 2016). Income (to the local governments) from leasing land to developers is 
substantially more than the compensation for the expropriation, and the land-expropriated farmers 
do not benefit from this value gap (Du et al., 2016), partly because they lack the rights to 
challenge the amounts they receive (Hui et al., 2013). 
The impact on the farmers themselves is multifaceted. Following the loss of their land, 
without the security provided through the ownership of cultivated land, land-expropriated farmers 
who are moved into cities both encounter financial difficulties and lack the same rights as other 
citizens who have a longer history of residence in an urban area. They are therefore marginalized 
in terms of employment opportunities and social security (Hui et al., 2013), with the literature 
suggesting that land-expropriated farmers are more likely to be surviving on low income and 
unemployed (Gan and Sun, 2015). Land-expropriated farmers become vulnerable because 
compensation standards do not match their losses and social security for their future livelihoods 
are inadequate (Sargeson, 2013). This causes discontentment among land-expropriated farmers, 
who resist using violence and appeals (Sargeson, 2013; Lian et al., 2016). 
Moreover, in China, there is no set regulation for compensation related to the demolition of 
houses in rural areas (Table 1). Only some local governments pay this type of compensation, 
leading to confusion amongst both home owners and those liable to pay compensation (Lu, 2015). 
Although research has supported the idea of compensation standards being legally established (Lu, 
2015; Liu, 2015), there remain major differences in the amounts of money actually paid, 
depending on interpretation of the policy by local government officials and whether houses are 
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being demolished on state-or collective-owned land (Liu, 2015). In China¶VXUEDQDUHDV, the house 
compensation value can be determined by the market price and assessed by authorized agencies 
according to The Legislation of House Expropriation and Compensation on State Owned Land 
(2011) (Table 1). In mining areas, which are mainly rural, compensation principles and standards 
are generally decided through negotiation between mining enterprises and farmers due to the 
absence of legislation or compensation standards (Li, 2014; Wang, 2016). 
Comparing China with other countries (Table 1), similarities include, firstly, that legally 
constructed houses which were built before land expropriation became public knowledge, are 
compensated-this applies to skeleton houses too. Secondly, the compensation principles and 
standards in other countries are legislated at the national level, such as in Vietnam, the UK and the 
USA, and the house compensation value is determined by the market price or the equivalent 
reinstatement value. However, national-level legislation in China indicates that only houses on 
state-owned land can be compensated according to the market price. Although there are concrete 
and specific compensation principles and standards for house demolition and compensation on 
collective owned land in some cities, compensation principles and standards in most cities are still 
decided by discussion and negotiation between those demanding land and farmers (Wang, 2016).   
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Table 1 House demolition and compensation in China compared with that in other countries 
Types Laws and legislations Levels Compensation scales Compensation principles and standards 
House demolition 
and compensation 
on state owned 
land in China 
The Legislation of House 
Expropriation and 
Compensation on State 
Owned Land (2011) 
National Legal and temporary houses are compensated, including house 
value compensation, moving and temporary relocation 
compensation, compensation for business and economic losses 
and lost profit. 
Houses constructed or expanded, or houses which changed use 
within one year of house expropriation becoming public, cannot 
be compensated.  
Compensation value is based on the market price and 
cannot be lower than the market price of a similar 
house. Compensation value is assessed by authorized 
agencies. 
 
 
House demolition 
and compensation 
on collective 
owned land in 
China 
The Law of Land 
Administration of the 
People's Republic of China 
(2004) 
National No mention Compensation standards for houses on expropriated 
land are determined by local governments. 
 The Legislation of 
Implementation of The Law 
of Land Administration of 
the People's Republic of 
China in Shanxi Province 
(2008) 
Province Legal houses on the expropriated land can be compensated.  
Houses constructed on illegally occupied land cannot be 
compensated. 
House value can be compensated with depreciation. 
Houses with equivalent area and identical quality can 
be given as compensation.  
 The Legislation of 
Collective Owned Land 
Expropriation and House 
Demolition Compensation 
and Relocation in Hengyang 
City Legal houses can be compensated, including house structure 
compensation, house decoration compensation, moving and 
temporary relocation compensation, compensation for business 
and economic losses and lost profit. 
Houses constructed or expanded, or houses which changed use 
Concrete and specific house structure compensation 
standards, decoration compensation standards, and 
moving and temporary relocation compensation 
standards. 
Monthly compensation for business and economic 
 6 
City, Hu¶nan Province 
(2015)  
within one year of house expropriation becoming public, cannot 
be compensated. House construction area exceeding 100 m2 per 
capita cannot be compensated. 
losses and lost profit is 14% of the value of 
dismantled houses, and lasts 6 months.  
 
House demolition 
and compensation 
in Vietnam 
The Land Law (2003) National Houses built consistent with planning laws, and constructed 
before land expropriation became publically known can be 
compensated. 
Houses built before land expropriation became publically 
known, but which were built on land intended for other uses 
cannot be compensated. 
Compensation value is based on the market price, or 
modified according to the market price. 
 
House demolition 
and compensation 
in the UK 
Land Compensation Acts 
(1973) 
National Houses are compensated together with the expropriated land. 
Houses must be legal and constructed before the land 
expropriation publicity. Compensation includes moving and 
temporary relocation compensation, compensation for business 
and economic losses and lost profit. 
Compensation value is based on the market price. 
Compensation value may be assessed by considering 
the cost of providing an equivalent reinstatement of 
the houses if there is no general market.  
House demolition 
and compensation 
in the USA 
Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (1976) 
 
National Houses are compensated together with the expropriated land 
and the houses must be legal and constructed before the land 
expropriation publicity. Compensation includes moving and 
temporary relocation compensation, compensation for business 
and economic losses and lost profit. 
Just compensation value is determined by looking at 
the fair market value of the houses. 
Compensation value may be increased by some 
percentages of market value according to the owners¶ 
emotion. 
Compensation value may be assessed by considering 
the cost of providing an equivalent reinstatement of 
the houses if there is no general market. 
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Skeleton houses (the minimum infrastructure for a particular building to be considered 
eligible for compensation, developed as an explicit tactic to increase the amount of compensation 
that residents and land-expropriated farmers receive) are also subject to demolition and can 
receive compensation. Mining areas are characterized by large numbers of skeleton houses, 
especially coal mining areas managed by central government enterprises. Although skeleton 
houses also exist in public industries and urban construction industries, they are quickly 
dismantled with compensation. Table 1 indicates that one reason for such skeleton house 
construction may be related to the absence of laws and legislation, not least because there are 
known differences in how land expropriation in mining areas and house demolition for urban 
construction are managed (Table 2). Nevertheless, few studies have attempted to consider the 
interests and interactive relationships among multiple stakeholders (e.g. central government 
mining enterprises, local governments and land-expropriated farmers) and how these shape 
skeleton house construction. Existing research focuses largely on the interests of land-expropriated 
farmers, standards of land expropriation, and the social securities in place. This paper targets this 
gap using the DPSIR framework as an analytical tool, to investigate why skeleton house 
FRQVWUXFWLRQ LV WDNLQJ SODFH LGHQWLI\LQJ VWDNHKROGHUV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI FXUUHQW WUHQGV LQ
compensation, and how the problem could be addressed.  
 
Table 2 Primary differences between local governments in land expropriation and house demolition 
Aspects 
Public industries and urban construction 
industries 
Mining areas managed by central government 
enterprises 
Status 
Local governments dominate, which results in 
a monopoly of compulsory land expropriation. 
Land developers are largely subordinates or 
branches of local governments (Wu and 
Zhang, 2011). 
Central government enterprises are not 
subordinate to local government. Conversely, 
local governments rely on the enterprises to 
boost economic development and supply 
mining land. Central government enterprises 
dominate land expropriation (Yin and Bai, 
2015).   
Benefit 
Local governments can rely on land finance 
revenue in order to boost local economic 
development. Usually, rural land is 
expropriated and auctioned by local 
governments, and local governments can gain 
land grant capital as the main source of land 
finance revenue (Wu and Zhang, 2011; Ye, 
Expropriation for mining land is granted by 
negotiation between enterprises and 
land-expropriated farmers. There is little land 
grant capital, and local governments can only 
gain some industrial land capitals, resource 
taxes and so on. Meanwhile, most benefits 
from coal mining are returned to the central 
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2014). government (Wang, 2016). 
Effect 
The local economy will grow and the urban 
environment will be improved. 
Land-expropriated farmers have better 
employment prospects and social security, all 
of which are sought by the local government 
(Zhao et al., 2014). 
Although the local economy and employment 
can be improved by the resource industries, 
local governments have to bear enormous 
pressures from employment and social 
security of land-expropriated farmers and 
transformations to the economy. Problems are 
particularly severe after coal reserves become 
exhausted (Wang, 2015).  
2 Methodology 
2.1 Study area 
Pinglu District, lies in the west of Shuozhou City, and Shuozhou City lies in the northwest of 
Shanxi Province, China in the semi-arid, warm temperate, continental monsoon climate zone 
(Table 3) and is a mixed mining-rural-settlement area (Cao and Bai, 2015). The area of Pinglu 
District is 2,314 km2 and constitutes 21.6% of the Shuozhou City. The study area is a part of 
Pinglu District, and it includes Jingping Town, Xiangyangbao Township, Baitang Township, 
Yuling Township, Taocun Township and Xiamiangao Township. The majority (90%) of coal 
production in the area comes from three surface (Antaibao, Anjialing, Donglutian) and three 
underground (No.1, No.2, No.3) mines operated by Pingshuo China Coal Corporation (PCCC), 
with the remainder from smaller, local underground mines. The mined area accounts for 70% of 
the study area (517 km2). The study area offers a useful case as it faces land expropriation issues 
similar to those experienced in other regions of China in recent years.  
Table 3 Physical characteristics of Pinglu District, Shanxi Province, China 
Characteristics Data 
Annual average temperature 4.8 to 7.8°C 
Annual rainfall 428.2 to 449.0 mm 
Terrain altitude 1300 to 1400 m 
Coal production 120 million tons 
Farmland 42 000 ha 
Construction land 4 000 ha 
 9 
Destruction landķ 6 000 ha 
ķDestruction land includes any degraded land cover, such as excavated sites, subsidised land and contaminated 
land (MLR, 2013). 
2.2 DPSIR model 
The DPSIR (Driving forces, Pressures, Statuses, Impacts and Responses) framework is a 
conceptual model for understanding complex interactions between human and environmental 
systems (Svarstad et al., 2008). Increasingly, researchers use the framework in environmental 
management, to assess and monitor environmental trends (Zhou et al., 2015). '36,5¶VIRFXVRQ
linkages encourages trans-disciplinary research, connects policy makers and stakeholders, and 
allows the framework to act as a heuristic tool for complex systems analysis. However, it has been 
critiqued for encompassing biophysical factors or socio-cultural dimensions rather than fully 
integrating both types of information. Further, it cannot quantitatively consider the dynamics of 
the system it models, handle cause-consequence relationships, suggests linear unidirectional 
causal chains, and ignores key non-human drivers of environmental change (Rekolainen et al., 
2003; Lewison et al., 2016). Despite these issues, it provides a useful framework for analysis in 
this research. We apply it in a novel situation not only to reveal the complex interactions between 
environmental impacts from coal mining and human dependency on the coal economy, but also to 
frame our analysis of the interests and interactive relationships among the multiple stakeholders in 
land expropriation and compensation. Such a novel application is justified because this research 
spans multiple disciplines including mining, ecology, environmental management and 
environmental social sciences and takes a systems approach, qualitatively analysing the 
interactions and relationships between stakeholders and the environment.  
A general DPSIR model has a broad scope. It contains different types of information about 
the environmental and human system (Zhou et al., 2015). In this study, DPSIR is used as a 
structuring tool as follows: 
z D (driving force) indicators reflect management policies and the human activities that 
affect the environment and society. 
z P (pressure) indicators reflect the environmental and social stress exerted by human 
activities. 
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z S (status) indicators reflect the current physical, biological and chemical statuses of the 
environment and the developmental statuses of the society. 
z I (impact) indicators reflect influences on the human social system due to status 
changes. 
z R (responses) indicators reflect social responses to the human social system impacts. 
In our study area, both environmental and human systems are severely disturbed by coal 
mining, with few obvious areas of agreement among the coal enterprises, local governments and 
land-expropriated farmers (Yin and Bai, 2015). For instance, land-expropriated farmers expand 
skeleton house construction or occupy land for their construction simply to obtain more 
compensation, which therefore acts against the interests of the coal enterprises. However, this 
phenomenon has largely been a result of policy drivers outside the control of the other main 
stakeholders. The result is a deterioration in both the environment and human systems. By 
analysing the driving forces, pressures, statuses, impacts we can reveal a more nuanced 
understanding of the processes at play, as well as the perspectives of different stakeholders, and 
develop ways forward to better control the issue.  
 
2.3 Data collection  
We used a mixed method approach to data collection, including semi-structured interviews, 
literature and document analysis (Table 4). Semi-structured interviews were conducted in May 
2016 with three staff from PCCC responsible for land expropriation; three staff from Pinglu 
District Government responsible for land use management; and sixty land-expropriated farmers. 
Land-expropriated farmers were interviewed with focus on the main labourers and dominant 
family members, and included thirty-six land-expropriated farmers yet to be relocated. There were 
forty-six men and fourteen women interviewed, and thirty-four interviewees aged from 
twenty-five to fifty-five. Twenty-six interviewees were above the age of fifty-five. Questions 
asked are summarised in Appendix 1.  
Table 4 Methodological approach, data types and information sources used to inform the development of the 
DPSIR model for land expropriation in Pinglu District, Shanxi Province, China. Questions are given in 
Supplementary Material (Appendix 1) 
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Methods Data and information themes 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
(Staff of Pingshuo 
PCCC) 
- Dust pollution compensation fees 
- Skeleton house compensation costs 
- Length of time before land compensation schemes are publicised that skeleton 
houses must be constructed  
- Water supply around mining area 
- Expropriated farmers struggles for more compensation 
- Methods for helping land-expropriated farmers 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
(Staff of Pinglu 
District Government) 
- Approaches taken to increase urbanisation rates and reduce income gaps 
- Residential urban land supply 
- Social security available for land-expropriated farmers 
- Attitudes towards skeleton houses  
Semi-structured 
interviews 
(Land-expropriated 
farmers) 
- Changes in compensation and relocation standards through time 
- Cost of skeleton house construction 
- Benefits gained from dismantling skeleton houses 
- Impacts of coal mining 
- Level of satisfaction with compensation and relocation standards  
- Importance and types of available social security 
Literature and 
document analysis 
(References and 
statistical year books) 
- Coal production, sale and income for PCCC (Cao and Bai, 2015; Cao et al., 2016) 
- When relocations occurred, which villages were moved and how many people 
were involved (Yin, 2013) 
- Economic situation in Pinglu District (Pinglu Statistics Yearbooks 1986, 1995, 
2004, 2013) 
- Areas of land use types (Cao and Bai, 2015) 
- Mining land supply (Yin and Bai, 2015) 
- When coal reserves became/will become exhausted (Cao and Bai, 2015) 
- Land-expropriated farmers¶ ideas about after land expropriation (Yin and Bai, 
2015) 
- Pension and unemployment benefits (Shuozhou News Website, 2014) 
- Cost and time of land expropriation (Yin and Bai, 2015) 
 
Data were qualitatively and quantitatively analysed using the DPSIR framework as an 
organising tool, summarising key findings and assigning them to the relevant element of the 
framework. Traits and changes to the system over time were subjected to quantitative analysis. For 
example, trend analysis and ratio analysis were adopted to discover the dynamics of coal 
production, sale and income in PCCC and economic development in Pinglu District. Qualitative 
analysis was also used, e.g. increases in land expropriation costs were summarized from changes 
in compensation and relocation standards, and dust pollution compensation fees, and the pressures 
of Pinglu District Government were comprehensively analyzed from residential urban land supply 
data, information on social security available for land-expropriated farmers, and so on. 
3 Results and discussions 
3.1 DPSIR model construction 
Semi-structured interviews were summarized, and the themes of responses of different 
stakeholders were tabulated according to the DPSIR framework categories (Table 5). Findings 
were triangulated and supplemented with information from the literature and documents and are 
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presented in relation to the DPSIR model (Table 6).  
Table 5 Summary of answers given in semi-structured interviews with multiple stakeholder groups (PCCC: 
Pinghuo China Coal Corporation; PDG: Pinglu District Government; LEF: Land-expropriated farmer) in Pinglu 
District, Shanxi Province, China. Text in bold indicates how answers relate to the DPSIR framework, according to 
whether they can be considered a driving force, pressure, status, impact or response (QPCCS: Question for PCCC 
staff. QPDGS: Question for Pinglu District Government staff. QEF: Question for land-expropriated farmer) is 
given in Supplementary Material/Appendix 1. 
Codes for 
respondents 
Summary of answers 
QPCCCS1 
z Two difficulties were identified: 1) land-expropriated farmers were not satisfied the 
compensation standards and wanted to get more compensation, because they were 
increasingly aware of their own future needs for income and social security (LEF-Driving 
force); 2) no detailed and effective compensation standards were made by the government 
(LEF-Driving force, PDG-Response). 
QPCCCS2 
z Land compensation and resettlement compensation standards were decided by law, but there 
were no clear compensation standards for ground attachments (buildings, structures and other 
things fixed on the ground) and un-harvested crops (LEF-Driving force, PDG-Response). 
Thus, land-expropriated farmers commonly constructed skeleton houses covering large areas 
and planted saplings at high density several years in advance of land expropriation notices 
becoming public (LEF-Pressure). By doing this, farmers could more than double the amount 
of compensation received (LEF-Impact). 
QPCCCS3 
z The government cooperated to inform land expropriation time, procedures, compensation 
standards, and assisted with registration of the land area, house statuses and other ground 
attachments and harvested crops. Sometimes the government helped land-expropriated 
farmers to get more compensation (PDG-Impact).  
QPCCCS4 
z We paid dust pollution compensation fees and transported water from other places to the 
rural settlements around the surface mining area (PCCC-Impact).  
QPCCCS5 
z The government should control skeleton house construction, make clear compensation 
standards for ground attachments and unharvested crops, and construct better social security 
systems in order to lessen dependence on compensation payments. Government should also 
oversee the distribution of compensation payments (PDG-Response). 
QPCCCS6 
z Controlling production costs is an effective way to increase the economic benefits of coal 
mining. This will also be helpful as a way to facilitate agreements between the coal 
enterprises and land-expropriated farmers. Production costs can be controlled (while still 
ensuring production is economically viable) through approaches such as ecological 
production, circular production and transparent production (PCCC-Response).  
QPDGS1 
z The development of Pinglu District depended on the coal industry, especially the PCCC 
(PDG-Driving force). The local government profited from industrial land capitals, resource 
taxes and so on. Most benefits of coal mining were turned over to the central government. 
Nevertheless, coal mining has helped the local government increase the urbanization rate, 
employment rate and improve living standards (PDG-Driving force). The local government 
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also worried about the income gap between land-expropriated farmers and urban people 
(PDG-Pressure), which increased the burden on local government (PDG-Impact). The local 
government must also consider urban land supply and social security provision for 
land-expropriated farmers (PDG-Status).   
QPDGS2 
z We have tried different compensation approaches, including the land use method, or 
changing land expropriation to land rent, but it was difficult to roll out widely. We have also 
researched other methods to reduce land expropriation costs (PDG-Response).  
QPDGS3 
z We found lots of skeleton houses constructed around surface mining areas (LEF-Impact). It 
was unnecessary for farmers to get local government¶s permission if they built skeleton 
houses on farmers¶ original residence bases. If constructed skeleton houses occupied other 
land, they would get local government¶s permission. Local government couldn¶t limit the 
construction areas and styles as long as they constructed on the permitted residence bases 
(PDG-Impact).  
QPDGS4 
z If the skeleton houses had been built before land expropriation notices were made public then 
the houses are legal. Any built after the publicity notices were built illegally and their owners 
did not receive compensation (PDG-Response). 
QLEF1 
z Most farmers knew about coal mining activity, but were not aware of specific planning or 
land expropriation notices (PCCC-Response). 
QLEF2 
z Impacts of surface coal mining included land destruction, house cracks because of blast 
vibrations, decreases in groundwater levels, and crop yield declines because of dust pollution 
(PCCC-Pressure, PCCC-Statue, PCCC-Impact).   
QLEF3: 
z More than 60% of farmers who had had their land expropriated were trying to relocate to 
other reclaimed land parcels, if that land was of high quality (PDG-Response). They were 
looking forward to reaching agreement and moving as soon as possible. Some were anxious 
about moving (LEF-Impact).  
QLEF4: 
z All land-expropriated farmers need sufficient compensation, good employment and high 
quality housing (PCCC-Impact). The compensation standards for land and resettlement are 
following in table 7. The compensation standard of skeleton houses was 600 CNY per m2 
(PCCC-Impact). Land-expropriated farmers had the opportunity to discuss the 
compensation standards and social securities (LEF-Response). 
QLEF5 
z Some land-expropriated farmers built skeleton houses using their savings, while some 
farmers borrowed money from others or from banks (LEF-Status). They did not take into 
account opportunity costs or risks. They also did not realise that their actions would increase 
the land expropriation cost and delay moving (LEF-Response). 
QLEF6 
z Most land-expropriated farmers saved their money in banks and bought commercial houses 
in towns and cities. There were no other reliable ways to invest money open to them 
(PDG-Response). In contrast, a few began to gamble or spend money on luxury goods 
(LEF-Response). 
QLEF7: 
z All land-expropriated farmers were satisfied with their living conditions after relocation, 
compared to their previous living conditions (LEF-Response). Some young people worried 
about their future, especially access to social security (PDG-Response).  
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Table 6 Driving forces, pressures, statuses and impacts from different stakeholders 
Stakeholders 
Driving forces 
 (D) 
Pressures 
 (P) 
Statuses 
 (S) 
Impacts 
 (I) 
PCCC  z D1: 
Expanding 
coal 
production 
capacity and 
increasing 
coal output 
to maximize 
economic 
benefits  
 
z P1: Destruction 
of land by 
mining 
activities 
z P2: Dust 
emission 
z P3: Blast 
vibration 
z S1: Increasing 
areas of land 
expropriated and 
destroyed 
z S2: Severe dust 
pollution 
z S3: Severe 
damage to 
housing 
z S4: Lower levels 
of groundwater  
z S5: Reduced crop 
yields 
z I1: Land near 
mining areas 
is unsuitable 
for living or 
farming; 
z I2: Rural 
settlements 
are moved or 
compensatio
n is paid for 
environment
al destruction 
z I3: Costs of 
coal 
production 
increase 
Pinglu District 
Government 
z D2: 
Promoting 
local 
economic 
development 
through the 
coal 
economy 
z D3: Meeting 
urbanization 
targets by 
relying on  
land-expropr
iated farmers 
relocating to 
towns and 
cities 
z P4: Coal 
resources 
transferring to 
coal enterprises 
z P5: Mining land 
supply 
z P6: Urban land, 
infrastructures 
and securities 
becoming 
scarce due to 
over-consumpti
on 
z S6: Coal resources 
exhaustion 
accelerated due to 
over production 
z S7: Mining land 
supply increasing 
z S8: Increments of 
urban land supply 
for residing, 
health insurance 
premium, etc 
z I4: Burden 
on local 
government  
increasing 
due to 
land-expropri
ated farmers 
moving to 
towns and 
cities 
z I5: 
Government 
acquiescence 
in 
construction 
of massive 
skeleton 
houses by 
land-expropri
ated farmers 
for more 
compensatio
n 
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Land-expropriated 
farmers 
z D4: 
Ambiguous 
compensatio
n standards 
z D5: Poor 
social 
security 
system 
 
z P7: Expanding 
skeleton houses 
or occupying 
land in order to  
build skeleton 
houses 
z S9: Lots of money 
and land used for 
constructing 
skeleton houses 
 
z I6: Area of 
land 
receiving 
compensatio
n due to the 
presence of 
housing 
rapidly 
increasing 
z I7: Land 
expropriation 
costs 
increasing; 
z I8: Slower 
rural 
settlement 
relocation 
rates 
 
3.2 Driving forces 
The market is an important driver of coal production. Indeed, the fundamental purpose of 
coal enterprises is to supply the market with coal to maximise economic benefits (Zhang, 2014). In 
meeting this goal, several PCCC mines have met and exceeded their designed production capacity 
(Cao et al., 2017). Between 2002 and 2011, coal production increased to 110 million tons, 
commercial coal sales were 85 million tons and income increased to 347 million CNY (Fig.1). 
While coal production was stable after 2010, sales were increasing, but income decreased slightly 
because of declining coal prices (Cao and Bai, 2015) (Fig.2).            
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Fig. 1 Coal production, sale and income in PCCC 
Pinglu District Government is dependent on the coal industry to meet its economic 
development targets. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the district increased by 25.66 billion 
CNY from 1986 to 2013, especially after 2004 (Fig. 2). Although the Local Financial Income (LFI) 
gradually increased, the ratio between LFI and Total Financial Income (TFI) gradually decreased 
(Fig. 2). While both Income of Urban Residents Per Capita (IURPC) and Income of Rural 
Residents Per Capita (IRRPC) increased, the ratio between IURPC and IRRPC decreased (Fig. 3), 
indicating that the income gap gradually expanded. Representatives of Pinglu District Government 
reflected that it was the very important for local government to reduce the income gap when 
land-expropriated farmers moved to urban areas, otherwise it was likely that in the longer term, 
the costs for local governments would be higher. 
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Fig. 2 Economic development in Pinglu District (Pinglu Statistics Yearbooks 1986, 1995, 2004, 2013). 1986: 
construction of Antaibao surface mine; 1995: primary production capacity of Antaibao surface mine; 2004: 
designed production capacity of Antaibao surface mine and Anjialing surface mine; 2013: over production capacity 
of Antaibao surface mine and Anjialing surface mine, and designed production capacity of Donglutian surface 
mine.   
Urbanization rates in the research area were 16.25% in 1996, increasing to 45.88% in 2013 
(PLSB, 1996; PLSB, 2013). The PCCC organized the relocation of land-expropriated farmers and 
now the majority live in towns and cities (Table 7). In 2012, The Pinglu District Government 
introduced a policy to increase the urbanization rate to 70% over the next few years (Cao and Bai, 
2015). Government representatives reflected during interviews that the government encouraged 
land-expropriated farmers to move to urban areas in order to meet these targets.  
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Compensation covers the cost of the land, ground attachments, un-harvested crops and a fee 
for resettlement (The Law of Land Administration of the People's Republic of China, 2004). For 
land and resettlement costs, compensation was paid at the highest rates available within the 
regulations (Yin and Bai, 2015). There are no clear standards for the compensation fee for ground 
attachments or for un-harvested crops. However, although it is stipulated that construction and 
crop planting after the land expropriation notice becomes public are not eligible for compensation, 
many farmers constructed skeleton houses in the previous five to ten years. This indicates that 
ambiguities in the compensation standards give land-expropriated farmers the chance to receive 
more compensation (Zhu and Dong, 2015), albeit at their own risk. The higher compensation for 
those with skeleton houses is an important driver of their construction.   
Land and housing represent farmers¶ source of income and security in China (Sargeson, 
2013). Following relocation, farmers said their living conditions and incomes improved, but many 
(especially those between forty and fifty years old) feared the future once the coal had been 
exhausted. They therefore hoped to demand more compensation. The opinions of 
land-expropriated farmers varied: 30.22% wanted to enjoy their old age in peace, 34.53% 
expected to depend on their children, 25.90% hoped to continue to work, and 9.35% wanted to 
have their own business (Yin and Bai, 2015). The land-expropriated farmers said they demanded 
sufficient compensation capitals, good employment positions and satisfactory houses in order to 
meet their basic needs. In China, most land-expropriated farmers own no technologies, lack 
education, and rely on social security (Xiong, 2016).     
 
3.3 Pressures 
Pressures on the environment from mining include land destruction, dust emission and blast 
vibration, all of which increase as more coal production takes place. Increases in coal production 
(and the associated transfer of land and resources to the mining sector) are driven by the 
requirements of the local economy to meet economic and urbanisation targets, both of which are 
dependent on the coal industry in this region of China. As more land is given over to mining, more 
farmers have their land expropriated. The Pinglu District Government was concerned about the 
income gap between the land-expropriated farmers and urban residents. The land-expropriated 
farmers said they also have this concern, especially as they feel social security provision is 
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inadequate, and maximising their compensation rates to address this is the reason behind the 
construction of skeleton houses up to ten years before land is actually expropriated for mining.  
 
3.4 Statuses 
Overproduction in the coal mining sector has led to an accelerated rate of reserve exhaustion. 
Indeed, it is now thought that mines in PCCC will be closed within forty years; some forty years 
earlier than their designed lifespan (Cao and Bai, 2015). As coal was mined more rapidly, more 
land was needed to supply the industry, resulting in ever greater areas of land being expropriated 
from farmers. For instance, the annual supply of land for mining for Antaibao and Anjialing 
surface coal mines was <330 ha before 2010. This doubled (to 660 ha) with the opening of the 
Donglutian surface coal mine (Yin and Bai, 2015).  
Land use types altered from cultivated land, woodland, grassland and rural settlements to coal 
mining land after expropriation. In the process of surface coal mining, the damaged land area 
increased from zero in 1986 to 6000 ha in 2013 (Cao et al., 2015). 10220 ha of cultivated land was 
destroyed by coal mining, mostly from 1986 to 2013, meanwhile other land uses saw losses too: 
woodland (2335 ha), grassland (4690 ha) and rural settlement (614 ha). The average damaged 
areas of cultivated land, woodland, grassland, rural settlement per 100 million tons of coal 
production were 1910 ha, 436 ha, 877 ha and 115 ha respectively.  
Dust pollution from surface coal mining can be severe and stems from blasting, loading, 
transporting and dumping (Mandal et al., 2012). The impacts of dust pollution include reduced crop 
growth and yields. Dust covered crop leaves in the study area for a long time because of the dry, 
low rainfall climate. Expropriated farmers reflected that crops within 3 km of the surface mining 
area were polluted by the dust, and yields reduced by 50%. Houses within 2 km of the opencast 
area were damaged with severe deformation and cracks by the blast vibration. Expropriated 
farmers said they were worried about the damage to their houses, but despite having their land 
expropriated, often still did not know when they would be moved to new properties. The water 
system was also affected (Manna and Maiti, 2016). The confluence of ground water changed 
because of landform changes, obstructing stream flow and altering water availability in the lower 
parts of small catchment basins (Manna and Maiti, 2016). Furthermore, underground water levels 
dropped because inflow routes were disrupted by the open pit (Struzina et al., 2011). Expropriated 
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farmers said the quantity of water in rivers downstream from mines had reduced, and some of 
them had become permanently dry. Expropriated farmers said that they could get underground 
water with wells around 10 m deep prior to the start of mining, but that subsequently even wells 
100 m deep were dry.  
Representatives of Pinglu District Government reflected that they must consider the amount 
of urban land required for rehousing land-expropriated farmers alongside their needs for 
employment. For instance, there were three communities (total area 59 ha) where 
land-expropriated farmers could live (Cao and Bai, 2015). Around 30% of land-expropriated 
farmers were subsequently employed by PCCC, 34% of them worked locally, around 25% were 
looking for work and 11% were recuperating from illness at home (Yin and Bai, 2015). Pinglu 
District Government promised that all of the land-expropriated farmers (whether they worked or 
not) should receive social security. 15,588 land-expropriated farmers paid a small premium and 
joined the social security system in 2014. In addition, 2893 land-expropriated farmers have started 
to receive pensions (totalling 19 million CNY) or unemployment benefits (SNW, 2014). 
Land-expropriated farmers focussed on how to attain more compensation. To do this they 
invested money, land and cultivated areas to construct skeleton houses. Their motivation is clearly 
seen from the compensation rates available to them. The land-expropriated farmers said cultivated 
land was compensated at 40 CNY m2, but houses received 600 CNY m2. Given it was possible to 
build a skeleton house for 300 CNY m2 financial gains were substantial. Scaling up, compensation 
per ha of cultivated land was 300,000 CNY. Converting this into skeleton houses, which are 
typically two-storeys, results in 2 ha of house area, delivering a net income of 6 million CNY after 
expropriation, some 20 times more than if the land had been left as cultivated land. In order to 
build this housing, land-expropriated farmers said they borrowed money or obtained loans. There 
was 484.46 ha of cultivated land occupied by rural settlements between 1986 and 2013, some of 
them consisting of skeleton houses. In China, house construction is forbidden on cultivated land 
except when land use planning permission has been granted. Although planning permission may 
be given, the house construction should be approved for cultivated land transformation by the 
county (district) governments (The Law of Land Administration of the People's Republic of China, 
2004). The highest rates of construction took place between 2000 and 2004, when 137.68 ha 
within 2 km around the stripped area of surface mines was built on (Cao and Bai, 2015). 
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3.5 Impacts 
Living and farming within 3 km of the surface mining area was deemed impossible by 
expropriated farmers. Four periods of relocation took place between 1986 and 2013 (Table 7). 
There were obvious differences and inconsistent compensation standards associated with 
relocation.  
In addition to expropriation costs, representatives of PCCC said that the enterprise pays an 
annual dust pollution compensation fee of 1720 CNY per capita to expropriated farmers who had 
not moved. Meanwhile, the enterprise must transport domestic water from other places to the coal 
mining area because of coal mining induced water scarcity. All of these factors increased the 
production costs of PCCC.  
The enterprise hoped land-expropriated farmers would move as soon as possible. 
Representatives of PCCC reflected that expropriated farmers wanted more compensation and 
better relocation packages because of rising costs of living and increased awareness of social 
security. Interviewees said that farmers had expanded or constructed skeleton houses five to ten 
years earlier, so they existed before the land compensation notices were made public. As such, 
they were legally entitled to compensation, resulting in an increased cost of expropriation for the 
coal enterprise. 
Table 7 Numbers of people relocated and villages moved during four phases of mining in Pingshou District, China. 
Information on the types of compensation paid was taken from interviews with land-expropriated farmers 
Time 
period 
Moved villages 
Relocated 
people 
Compensations 
1985-1995 Antaibao, 
Cuijialing, Nansi, 
Dongsuanci, 
Yingziwa, 
Xisuanci 
1900 z Land compensation fee and un-harvested crop 
compensation fee were 3 CNY per m2; 
z One worker in each family was given work in PCCC; 
z Compensation fee for relocation was 8000 CNY per 
capita; 
z Each family could get 2000 CNY to buy one relocation 
house of 150 m2 (3000 CNY); 
z Men above 60 years old and women above 50 years old 
could get monthly pension of 200 CNY per capita 
1998-2002 Baixinyao, Shang 
yao, Maanshan 
1500 z Land compensation fee was 16 CNY per m2; 
z Crop compensation fee was 7000 CNY per capita; 
z Workers between 18-35 years old in each family were 
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employed by PCCC; 
z Compensation fee for relocation was 10000 CNY per 
capita; 
z Each family can buy one relocation house of 160 m2 in 
Qinyi Community in Jingping Town (80000 CNY); 
z Residents under 18 years old could get a monthly living 
subsidy of 160 CNY per capita, residents between 
18-22 years old could get a monthly unemployment 
subsidy of 360 CNY per capita, residents between 
60-85 years old could get a monthly pension of 560 
CNY per capita 
2007-2010 Qianÿanjialing, 
Houdong, Houxi, 
Baishiya, 
Yangquan 
4900 z Land compensation fee and un-harvested crop 
compensation fee were 31 CNY per m2; 
z Those 18-35 years old in each family were arranged 
work in the PCCC; 
z Compensation fee for relocation was 80000 CNY per 
family; 
z Each family can buy a relocation apartment in 
Wenyuan Community in Jingping Town, and the price 
was 960 CNY per m2 if the apartment area per capita 
was less than 30 m2, otherwise, the price was 1260 
CNY per m2; 
z Residents under 18 years old could get a monthly living 
subsidy of 160 CNY per capita, residents between 
18-22 years old could get a monthly unemployment 
subsidy of 360 CNY per capita, residents between 
60-85 years old could get a monthly pension of 560 
CNY per capita 
2011-2013 
(in 
process at 
the time of 
data 
collection) 
Qiaoqian, 
Qiaohou, Nanwa, 
Zhuanjing, 
Yuling, 
Xuejiagang, 
Louzigou 
7400 z Land compensation fee and un-harvested crop 
compensation fee were 37 CNY per m2; 
z Compensation fee for relocation was under discussion; 
z Each family can buy a relocation apartment in Shanxue 
Community in Jingping Town, and the price was under 
discussion; 
z The house rental costs of moved farms in Jingping 
Town was paid by PCCC; 
z Residents under 18 years old could get a monthly living 
subsidy of 160 CNY per capita, residents between 
18-22 years old could get a monthly unemployment 
subsidy of 360 CNY per capita, residents between 
60-85 years old could get a monthly pension of 560 
CNY per capita 
PCCC is a central government enterprise based in Pinglu District. The representatives of 
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Pinglu District Government said sometimes they lacked influence on decisions around land 
expropriation and could not decide the scale, timing or standards of compensation standards. 
Pinglu District Government and land-expropriated farmers both felt that the land-expropriated 
farmers should be entitled to greater access to social security payments (Yin and Bai, 2015). The 
representatives of PCCC said that Pinglu District Government helped the land-expropriated 
farmers to achieve higher levels of compensation through policy deregulation in rural housing 
sites and house extensions. Government representatives said that they knew the actions of 
land-expropriated farmers, but it was very difficult to manage and control the house construction 
areas and the styles. As a result, the cost of land expropriation increased as a greater area of land 
was taken up by housing. Representatives of PCCC said the house construction area requiring 
compensation also doubled due to skeleton house construction. Meanwhile, land-expropriated 
farmers felt they should receive even higher levels of compensation for the skeleton houses to 
cover the opportunity costs of the time, money and land. Thus, land expropriation costs increased, 
making it harder to reach agreements on compensation standards, especially when the demand for 
coal started to fall. This resulted in a delay in when expropriated famers could actually relocate 
away from mines.  
 
3.6 Responses 
The driving forces, pressures, statuses and impacts of multiple stakeholders relating to 
skeleton houses construction have been analyzed in the previous sections. Responses are proposed 
here according to the elements under the driving forces, pressures, statuses and impacts categories 
(Fig. 3). Some responses directly relate to skeleton houses; others are indirectly related, 
meanwhile, the response processes of different stakeholders for skeleton house issues are 
demonstrated (Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6). The existence of and compensation for skeleton house 
demolition is not only related to the land expropriation institution; it also relates to the 
relationships between the stakeholders. For instance, skeleton house construction is a response 
undertaken by farmers who are dissatisfied with the compensation they receive for their loss of 
livelihood options. Most responses carried out by stakeholders are therefore, based on their own 
best interests and are not intended to solve or ameliorate the current compensation processes.      
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Fig. 3 Possible responses of the three stakeholder groups (Ƶ: PCCC, Ɓ: Pinglu District Government, ֩: 
Land-expropriated farmers) to the driving forces, pressures, statuses and impacts of the expanding coal mining 
sector in Pinglu District, Shanxi Province, China.  
  
(1) Responses of PCCC 
PCCC should change the notion of economic benefit maximization and pursue a different 
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approach to production that takes into account land compensation and destruction. Doing this 
would likely decrease the cost of production and therefore improve profitability (Fig. 3 and Fig. 4) 
(Fan et al., 2015). It is thus essential that PCCC adopts advanced production techniques and 
technologies to reduce the environmental impacts from surface coal mining (Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). 
For example, methods of avoidance, containment, suppression, and collection were used in 
Australia to control dust emission (DECCW, 2010). Dust and weather monitoring equipment, air 
humidity devices and hopper trucks were used to reduce dust (DECCW, 2010; Liu et al., 2016), 
and new explosives can be adopted for reducing blasting impacts (Wang et al., 2016). Meanwhile, 
the ecological environment in the mining area can be improved by limiting exposed areas, 
accelerating damaged land reclamation and optimizing land reclamation quality (DECCW, 2010; 
Zhou and Zhou, 2013). Ecological production will increase the production cost, but it will reduce 
the environmental impacts from coal mining and the dust pollution compensation fee, and will be 
helpful for gaining capital and reaching agreements on skeleton house demolition and 
compensation. 
In the process of relocation, PCCC needs to be responsible for the employment of 
land-expropriated farmers in order to reduce the relocation cost. It would be helpful for PCCC to 
link up with more non-resource, low consumption enterprises to extend industrial chains and 
increase green industrial chains, creating new jobs (Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). The coal industry relying on 
industrial chain extension creates jobs in industries that support coal mining, and by providing 
reliable and low cost electricity that stimulates growth across the entire economy, especially in 
manufacturing (NCC, 2015). Experiences from around the word support this. There were 25,000 
new jobs provided after coal in Kentucky (US) dependent on new industrial chains related to 
energy efficiency, forest products tourism and environmental remediation (Ackerman and 
Comings, 2015). PCCC focuses on coal production, coal sale and electricity generation. Lots of 
jobs are associated with this industry, in coal mining, coal sale, coal transportation and electricity 
generation. Developing a cleaner coal chemical industry is an important method for extending coal 
industrial chains. Ecological agriculture and installation agriculture can be implemented on the 
reclaimed land, meanwhile, ecological tourism can be developed with the advantage of industrial 
landscape, restored area, ecological agriculture and installation agriculture. All of these are 
effective for creating new jobs. Coal enterprise and land-expropriated farmers can therefore 
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benefit from industrial chain extensions and increases, while improved economic development and 
employment rates will be welcomed by the local government and local residents. Importantly, 
land-expropriated farmers could profit from extending and increasing industrial chains because 
more job opportunities help the land-expropriated farmers to reduce their dependence on land 
expropriation and skeleton house compensation which will therefore also facilitate agreement on 
the issue of skeleton house demolition and compensation. 
 
Land expropriation processes should be more transparent (Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). The 
land-expropriated farmers should be kept informed and PCCC should take into account that 
farmers would like to know how expropriation decisions are taken and the implications for them. 
Involving farmers in these processes is likely to increase satisfaction with land expropriation 
compensation. Thus, PCCC should keep farmers fully informed of plans for mines and subsequent 
land expropriation. Farmers should also be made aware of opportunities and benefits associated 
with relocation. Providing more complete information could reduce the incentive for farmers to 
rush to build skeleton houses (Fu, 2014; He and Asami, 2014). The land-expropriated farmers said 
they did not know the concrete coal mining plans and thought their skeleton houses would be 
dismantled and compensated at most, five years after construction. They failed to realize that their 
skeleton houses might not have been dismantled ten years later. Similarly, if farmers can fully 
participate in the land expropriation process, effective feedback (e.g. through hearings and 
meetings) should ensure that expropriation can proceed more efficiently for the farmers 
themselves (Hong, 2016). Increased transparency is likely to be welcomed by farmers and 
although the coal enterprise may not initially see many benefits from being more open about their 
plans, in the longer term they are likely to see a reduction in costs and fewer delays when they 
wish to expand operations. 
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Fig. 4 Response process of PCCC to skeleton houses 
 (2) Responses of Pinglu District Government 
Local governments should play an important role in land expropriation, especially in skeleton 
house management, not least because they put together land expropriation policies, approve land 
use management plans and protect the rights of farmers who have their land expropriated.  
It is necessary to focus on the interests of PCCC, Pinglu District Government and 
land-expropriated farmers in the approval of land supplies (Fig. 3 and Fig. 5). The coal enterprises 
would like to increase the demand for land for mining in order to increase profits. The 
land-expropriated farmers want to receive higher levels of compensation (as demonstrated by the 
construction of skeleton houses). A strong land use management system is required to 
simultaneously address these issues. In Australia, state and local government strategic land use 
planning across coal rich regions was strictly abided by to create huge potential for sustained coal 
mining (Glowacz and Abnet, 2011). Thus, Pinglu District Government should supply coal mining 
land according to a land use plan, rather than via an ad hoc process. The representatives of Pinglu 
District Government said if the coal mining land is controlled, the speed of local economic 
development and urbanization of land-expropriated farmers will also be controlled. They also said 
they can strictly control house extensions in rural areas, dismantle skeleton houses and impose a 
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system of fines for illegal skeleton house construction. Although strengthening the role of the local 
government might impose constraints on the expansion of the coal sector, it will also reduce 
skeleton house construction, lower compensation payments for other land expropriation in the 
short term and concentrate capital for skeleton house demolition and compensation, and speed up 
the relocation of expropriated farmers.   
There is no effective supervising mechanism for land expropriation in China (Li, 2015). The 
representatives of Pinglu District Government thought that establishing a land expropriation office 
to supervise land expropriation and compensation would be an effective mechanism (Fig. 4 and 
Fig. 6). This would (i) accelerate the implementation of land expropriation and skeleton 
demolition and reduce the time farmers must wait for compensation, and avoid skeleton house 
construction again because of delayed implementation; and (ii) ensure that any compensation is 
justified and reasonable. It is very important to let land-expropriated farmers know that their 
proper rights and social securities are protected by the government. Bao and Peng (2016) indicated 
that when land-expropriated farmers thought their rights and securities were protected, their 
uncertainty about the future decreases, and they no longer carry out other activities to increase 
compensation. Overall, it gives them encouragement to reach agreement in skeleton house 
demolition and compensation.  
Pinglu District Government can also reform mining land institutions in order to reduce the 
land expropriation costs for PCCC (Fig. 3 and Fig. 5). The representatives of PCCC said that land 
expropriation costs were too high, and they hoped Pinglu District Government would reform 
mining land institutions. In other opencast mining areas, reforms have already been implemented. 
For example, land for an opencast area and dump site can be rented for five to ten years from the 
rural collective, and then returned to the rural collective after reclamation. The land for industrial 
sites can be expropriated and transferred to the enterprise for fifty years (Li, 2011). The cost of 
land rent is less than that of land expropriation (Kang and Liu, 2015). The reclaimed land is 
managed by PCCC, and there is no effective method for the enterprise to retire the reclaimed land 
management in order to reduce its cost. The representatives of PCCC also said Pinglu District 
Government should make policies to help the enterprise retire from the management of reclaimed 
land and encourage land-expropriated farmers to take it on. Thus, both the coal enterprise and the 
land-expropriated farmers will benefit from the reform of mining land institutions. It will help the 
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coal enterprise to decrease land use costs and give the opportunity to increase skeleton house 
demolition and compensation, meanwhile, it will help the land-expropriated farmers to reduce 
their dependency on compensation.  
Pinglu District Government should actively participate in land expropriation compensation 
and relocation (Fig. 3 and Fig. 5). The government firstly should ensure that ground attachment 
(including skeleton houses) compensation standards meet The Law of Land Administration of the 
People's Republic of China (2004), and these standards must be considerate, feasible, quantitative 
and uncontested (Mei, 2007). The government secondly must develop an improved social security 
system for land-expropriated farmers in terms of employment, education, health and provision for 
their old age, and avoid them being marginalized on moving to towns and cities (Hui et al., 2013). 
The government thirdly should help land-expropriated farmers to manage the compensation 
capital and supply information and technology services to ensure their employment and future 
livelihoods (Bao and Peng, 2016). Finally, the government should participate in the land 
expropriation, especially cooperate with the enterprise in the identification, discussion and 
registration of legal compensating objects after the publicity of the land expropriation notice (Liu 
et al, 2016). The representatives of PCCC also said that the ground attachment compensation 
standards were helpful as they clearly implemented compensation for skeleton house demolition. 
Meanwhile, the land-expropriated farmers reflected that help from the government can reduce 
their worries about their future incomes. Thus, all of these will be helpful for reaching agreement 
in skeleton house demolition and compensation. 
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Fig. 5 Response process of Pinglu District Government (PDG) to skeleton houses 
 (3) Responses to land-expropriated farmers  
Given that farmers are most impacted by the expansion of coal mining, they should play a 
role in shaping both how compensation is distributed, and the appropriate levels of compensation. 
The land-expropriated farmers should discuss the compensation standards and social security 
policies in the hearing meetings with the enterprise and the government (Fig. 3 and Fig. 6). 
Generally, if the land-expropriated farmers participate in making the compensation standards, they 
will feel more satisfied with the resulting schemes (Liu et al, 2012), thus ensuring the process 
awards reasonable levels of compensation. In addition, land-expropriated farmers should 
participate in funding various cooperative organizations and companies with their land 
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expropriation capital and the information and technology supplied by the government, and be paid 
interest according to their stocks (Bao and Peng, 2016). This will assist the land-expropriated 
farmers to have confidence that they will gain more benefits as a result of their own actions, rather 
than focusing entirely on getting more compensation from skeleton house demolition. Both of 
them will be helpful for PCCC to reach agreement in skeleton house demolition and 
compensation. 
It is necessary for land-expropriated farmers to compare the current compensation standards 
with the former compensation standards, while also comparing present living standards of the 
former land-expropriated farmers with the original living standards (Fig. 3 and Fig. 6). This will 
KHOS WR DOOD\ IDUPHUV¶ FRQFHUQV EXW DOVR KHOS PCCC and Pinglu District Government to make 
reasonable and considerate compensation standards and social security policies (Kang and Liu, 
2015), helping to reach agreement on skeleton house demolition and compensation. The monetary 
opportunity cost and risk should be realized by the land-expropriated farmers who plan to 
construct skeleton houses five to ten years before land expropriation. The land-expropriated 
farmers said that they had not taken into account these costs and risks when they constructed 
skeleton houses. Farmers should not only be made more aware of their legal obligation not to 
construct skeleton houses after land compensation notices become public, but also avoid 
constructing them in the first place. Qin et al. (2015) indicated that skeleton house construction 
increases land expropriation costs and slows down farmer relocation. If they understood both of 
these things, it would reduce the incentive to build skeleton houses. Finally, farmers should also be 
made aware that compensation capital represent only one aspect of their future livelihood security 
(Fig. 3 and Fig. 6) and that any money should be reasonably spent (Wang, 2009). 
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Fig. 6 Response process of land-expropriated farmers (LEF) for skeleton house 
3.7 Interactive relationships and multiple stakeholder goals 
House demolition compensation is one part of land expropriation compensation. Skeleton 
house construction can reflect both the issues of land expropriation compensation and the 
interactive relationships among multiple stakeholders. Overall, PCCC aspires to maximise 
economic benefits, including land expropriation cost reduction, and is reluctant to compensate the 
massive skeleton houses. Land-expropriated farmers want to get more compensation for the future 
security. Pinglu District Government depends on PCCC, yet hopes the land-expropriated farmers 
get more compensation. The interactive relationships among the multiple stakeholders are 
illustrated in Fig. 7. Some relationships have connections on both sides, and some of them do not, 
yet they need to be connected.  
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Fig. 7 Interactive relationships of the three stakeholder groups 
Solid arrow: relationship has been connected; N: relationship hasn¶t connected. 
PCCCėPDG: (1) supplying mining land; (2) making concrete land expropriation compensation legislation; (3) 
controlling skeleton house construction; (4) actively joining in land expropriation; (5) supervising land 
expropriation and compensation with special office; (6) reforming land expropriation institution. 
LEFėPDG: (7) acquiescing skeleton house construction; (8) releasing residence base management; (9) perfecting 
social securities. 
PDGėPCCC: (10) boosting economic development; (11) increasing population urbanization rate; (12) improving 
living standard; (13) increasing land expropriation compensation; (14) supplying jobs; (15) minimizing 
environmental impacts; (16) slowing down land expropriation. 
LEFėPCCC: (17) increasing land expropriation compensation; (18) supplying jobs; (19) paying environmental 
compensation fee; (20) sufficient social securities; (21) minimizing environmental impacts; (22) making coal 
mining plans public. 
PDGėLEF: (23) alleviating government¶s pressure; (24) reasonably using land expropriation compensation 
capital; (25) actively cooperating with PCCC. 
PCCCėLEF: (26) stopping skeleton house construction; (27) comparing compensation standards; (28) realizing 
monetary opportunity cost and risk; (29) knowing the impact of skeleton houses. 
 
4 Conclusions 
Land use management in mining areas in China is complex and involves many competing 
interests and interactive relationships between stakeholder groups. This complexity is reflected in 
the variety of opinions and relationships that we have revealed in our analyses of PCCC, Pinglu 
District Government and land expropriated farmers, all of whom can play a role in, and would 
benefit from, reducing and eliminating skeleton house construction. PCCC would benefit from 
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investing in cleaner coal production methods, as this would reduce the amount of land required by 
their mines, minimise other environmental impacts and therefore minimise the numbers of farmers 
who they pay compensation to. This, ultimately, will reduce the costs of coal production and allow 
the Corporation to maintain profits. The Government should change its role from one whereby it 
promotes coal mining at almost any cost in order to meet economic and urbanisation targets, to 
one which protects the rights of farmers to fair compensation and comparable livelihood 
opportunities after relocation. Instigating a transparent and fair land planning process would be an 
important step in achieving this switch of roles. Finally, the farmers themselves need to play a role. 
If they are meaningfully brought into planning, compensation decision making and relocation 
processes, then they are more likely to feel that the compensation they receive is fair and, 
therefore, be less likely to exploit loopholes in legislation to artificially increase the amounts they 
receive through, for example, the construction of skeleton houses. Thus, the solutions to skeleton 
house demolition compensation not only rely on making compensation regulations, but also on 
connecting and smoothing the relationships among multiple stakeholders. Understanding multiple 
VWDNHKROGHUV¶ SHUVSHFWLYHV XVLQJ WKH '36,5 IUDPHZRUN DV D WRRO WR VWUXFWXUH RXU DQDO\VLV KDV
allowed us to identify ways forward that target each group. Such multi-stakeholder analyses could 
be applied in other countries and contexts in order to reduce conflicts around land use change and 
identify fairer approaches to deliver reasonable compensation to land expropriated farmers.    
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Appendix 1 Smi-structured interview questions   
Interviewees Questions 
Pingshuo  
China  
Coal  
Corporation Staff 
(PCCCS) 
z QSPCCC1: What were the difficulties in the process of land expropriation? 
z QSPCCC2: What did the land-expropriated farmers do in order to get more 
compensation? 
z QSPCCC3: What did Pinglu District Government do in the process of land 
expropriation? 
z QSPCCC4: What did you do about the impacts from surface coal mining? 
z QSPCCC5: What should the Pinglu District Government do in the process of land 
expropriation? 
z QSPCCC6: What should the PCCC do in order to control production costs? 
Pinglu  
District 
Government 
Staff  
(PDGS) 
z QSPDG1: How did the Pinglu District Government profit from coal industry? 
z QSPDG2: How did the Pinglu District Government reform the land expropriation 
institution? 
z QSPDG3: Did the expropriated-land farmers apply for permission to construct skeleton 
houses? 
z QSPDG4: Did the Pinglu District Government prohibit and dismantle the illegal skeleton 
houses?  
Land- 
expropriated 
farmers 
(LEF)  
z QLEF1: Did you know about and see the coal mining planning and land expropriation 
planning process? 
z QLEF2: What were the impacts to the land, the house, the groundwater and the crop in 
the coal mining areas?  
z QLEF3: Would you mind relocating on the reclaimed land?  
z QLEF4: What were the compensation standards for land expropriation and skeleton 
houses? 
z QLEF5: What were the sources of funding for constructing new houses? 
z QLEF6: What did people do when you got such a high compensation capital? 
z QLEF7: How satisfied were you with the living conditions after relocation?  
 
